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Abstract 
 
Objective 
 The impact of low-cost health insurance on the costs incurred by Namibian employers 
was measured. 
 
Background 
Namibia has a relatively recent HIV epidemic and adult HIV prevalence estimated at 
15.3%.  AIDS-related mortality would be rising in the absence of antiretroviral treatment. 
(ART). Medical schemes in Namibia now offer low-cost policies that include good 
coverage for treatment of AIDS, including ART.  In 2006-2007, a number of large 
Namibian employers agreed to purchase such policies for their uninsured workers. 
 
Methodology 
We compared data on worker attrition and related costs for the period before and after 
purchase of the low cost health insurance policy. 
 
Results 
Worker attrition (death and medical retirement) reported by the companies declined 
from a range of 1.5% to 2.0% of the work force in 2005 and 2006 to 0.7% to 1.1% in 
2008.  When data was pooled, attrition fell from a peak of 1.7% of the combined work 
force in 2005 to 0.9% in 2008. Attrition-related costs at the companies were lower in 
2008 than in the peak attrition years.  The downward trend in attrition appears to have 
begun before the date when the firms purchased the new policies. 
 
The 2008 value of the savings measured was less than the annual cost of the premiums 
for the new policies. 
 
Discussion 
Antiretroviral treatment appears to reduce workforce attrition and related costs for 
Namibian employers.  However, we cannot say if this is a result of new low-cost 
insurance policies or the rapid expansion of ART in the public sector.
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Study Objective 
We set out to identify and quantify the effects on employer costs of providing health insurance 
cover that includes antiretroviral therapy to workers not previously covered by health insurance 
 
 
Background 
Namibia, like South Africa, has an active health insurance (medical scheme) industry that 
provides risk pooling for the expenses of private medical care.  Combined with relatively 
generous public health care system funding, this system allows Namibia to have one of the 
lowest levels of out-of-pocket health spending (as a percentage of total health spending) in the 
developing world.  One large scheme for government workers, the Public  Service Employees 
Medical Aid Scheme (“PSEMAS”)), covers private outpatient care and inpatient care in the 
private wing of Government hospitals.  Four insurers offer medical scheme coverage in the 
market, while additional “closed” medical schemes are open only to the employees of a 
particular company or industry.  In 2004, total membership in medical schemes was 
approximately 250,000 (118,000 in PSEMAS and 132,000 in private schemes).
1
  This covered 
approximately 12% of the Namibian population of two million. 
 
As in South Africa, most health insurance policies are purchased through employers, who offer 
their employees the opportunity to join one or more medical schemes.  Traditionally, insured 
health benefits have been extensive, and the premium for scheme membership relatively high.  
Employers make a contribution to the scheme premium as part of the employment package.  The 
employer share of the premium is a business expense to the employer (the same as wages).  This 
amount is taxable income to the employee (also treated the same as wages). Since the employer 
contribution is usually only a part of the premium
2
, employees must contribute the remainder of 
the premium from their pay.  As a result, few lower wage workers have joined the existing 
schemes.  Instead, they pay out of pocket for private care or seek care in the public sector. 
 
Like the rest of southern Africa, Namibia has been hard hit by the AIDS epidemic.  Prevalence 
recorded in antenatal surveys peaked at 19.9% in 2006 and declined to 17.8% in 2008.
3
   The 
adult (age 15-49) prevalence of HIV in Namibia was estimated in the most recent UNAIDS 
country report as 15.3% (range 12.4%-18.1%)
4
.   
 
Antiretroviral therapy (ART) for AIDS has been a covered benefit in most existing Namibian 
medical scheme policies for nearly a decade.  However, roll out of ART in the public sector did 
not begin until 2004, with support by the President’s Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) and the Global Fund.  By 2009, an estimated 80% of those Namibians in need of 
treatment were receiving ART,  a rate matched by no other country in Africa except Botswana. 
 
                                                 
1
 Feeley F, DeBeer I, RinkedeWit T, vanderGaag J.  The Health Insurance Industry in Namibia: Baseline Report, 
June 2006 
2
 PSEMAS is the exception, with Civil Servants paying only a nominal monthly membership fee.  As a result, most 
of the public sector work force is covered by PSEMAS.. 
3
 Press conference by Minister of Health, November 25, 2009 
4
 UNAIDS web site. Namibia country report.  Accessed 30/11/09. 
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After recovering from financial difficulties early in this decade, the medical scheme industry in 
Namibia was ready to consider expansion to lower income markets.  The competitors generally 
recognized that enrollment had plateaued, and with continued high medical inflation some 
traditional scheme members might begin to drop out due to escalating premiums.  Therefore, 
there was interest among medical schemes in possible low-cost policies that would expand the 
market.   In 2004, the Diamond Health scheme was introduced, offering a broad primary care 
benefit at low cost, paying participating providers on a capitation rather than a fee-for service 
basis.  Other low cost schemes followed using traditional fee-for-service payment methods.   
 
All the low-cost plans offer coverage for first-line ART.  The lowest cost option, Vitality, offers 
coverage for HIV/.AIDS treatment only, including antiretroviral therapy and inpatient care for 
AIDS-related diseases.  It was originally priced at $N 30  ($US 4.60)
5
 per employee per month.
6
  
Participating employers were required to enroll all employees currently lacking medical scheme 
coverage in Vitality to avoid adverse selection of those who know their HIV status.  A related 
policy, Vitality Day Care, added a limited general outpatient benefit to encourage patients to 
seek care for other diseases, and was priced higher.  Because of its interest in promoting 
affordable private sector health care, Pharmaccess supported the low-cost policies with technical 
and financial assistance.  In order to encourage enrollment, Pharmaccess paid a small subsidy of 
$N10 and $N30 per person month (US$ 1.50 to US$4.60) for the low cost policies in the period 
2005-2008.  Because the Vitality product was limited to AIDS alone and Pharmaccess wished to 
encourage general access to care, premiums for this “AIDS only” product were not subsidized. 
 
Pharmaccess and the individual insurers worked with the Namibia Business Coalition on AIDS 
(NABCOA) and other business groups to encourage companies to enroll uninsured employees in 
the low cost plans.
7
  By 2009, total enrollment in all low-cost plans was 16,000, an increase of a 
little less than 1% over the 12% coverage level in 2004.  
 
To evaluate the impact of the low-cost health insurance plans, and the health impact of insurance 
generally, Pharmaccess and the Amsterdam Institute of International Development (AIID)—in 
collaboration with the Survey Research Center at the University of Namibia—conducted a 
population-wide household survey in Windhoek from 2006 to 2009.  The study follows a panel 
of households, obtaining information on health seeking behavior, health care costs and health 
outcomes as well as health insurance enrollment.  The study also collected data on a series of 
biomedical indicators on the participants, including HIV infection status.  The third and last 
round of these panel surveys completed in late 2009, and the results are reported elsewhere. 
 
 
Study Overview 
By lowering economic barriers to treatment, health insurance for workers should have benefits 
for the employer, reducing the costs associated with absenteeism and employee attrition related 
to disease.  To test this hypothesis, AIID commissioned Boston University to conduct a study of 
                                                 
5
 US$ = 6.5 rand/Namibian dollars at time of writing. 
6
 The current price is Nam$39 per month 
7
 DeBeer I, Coutinho H, VanWyk P, Gaeb E, RinkedeWit T, vanVugt, M  “Anonymous HIV workplace surveys as 
an advocacy tool for affordably private health insurance in Namibia”,  Journal of the International AIDS Society, 
2009:27 
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costs related to worker illness in companies purchasing the low-cost health insurance plans.  The 
basic design was a “pre/post” intervention analysis of employer costs linked to disease-related 
absenteeism and attrition, using a modification of the methodology developed by Rosen, Simon 
et al.
8
 to measure the costs to employers in Southern Africa of AIDS in the work force.  As 
reported here, the study collected data on costs associated with employee attrition at cooperating 
employers for two or three years prior to purchase of  low-cost insurance plans  for previously 
uninsured workers, and one or two “intervention” years after enrollment in the plans.  Because of 
the difficulties in obtaining employer cooperation, the study does NOT include a control group 
of similar firms whose lower wage employees remained uninsured throughout the study period.      
 
Selection of Participating Companies 
The first problem for the study was to obtain employer participation.  Criteria for firm 
participation included the following: 
 Purchased Vitality or Vitality Day Care product for uninsured workers shortly after the 
products were introduced in the second half of 2006 
 Maintained good records in the Human Resource Department, with the ability to analyze 
these records and separate absenteeism for workers who died/retired from the work force 
as a whole 
 Large enough (generally over 100 employees) that some employee deaths or medical 
retirements would be expected each year. 
 Management agreed to participate in the study.  The research team offered to defray the 
costs of data collection at the firms.  One participating firm accepted this offer and was 
paid for the costs of programming special reports from its HR data system. 
 
To maintain confidentiality, the study team never obtained individually identified data about 
employees.  The data was collected by HR personnel at the firm who had routine access to such 
data in the normal course of business, and was reported for the study in aggregate form.  As a 
result, the Institutional Review Board of Boston University Medical School determined that the 
study was exempt from the requirement for ethical review because no individually identified data 
was collected by the researchers. 
 
A variety of Namibian firms of sufficient size were approached and asked to participate.  A 
written request was followed with an in-person visit from a member of the research team if the 
initial response was positive.  Firms meeting the inclusion criteria were then sent a letter 
(Appendix One) explaining the study and the data required, and requested to sign the letter 
indicating their willingness to participate. Six companies agreed.  One of these companies had 
sponsored ART for its employees since approximately 2001, so “pre- intervention” data was not 
available, and that company is not included in the analysis reported here. 
 
Methods 
The study is a “pre-post” intervention study at the participating firms. Annual costs associated 
with worker attrition are compared before and after the point at which the firms enrolled their 
uninsured workers in the Vitality or Vitality Day Care Plan.  
 
                                                 
8
 Rosen S, Vincent  J , Mcleod W, Fox M, Thea D, Simon J  “The cost of HIV/AIDS to businesses in southern 
Africa,” AIDS, 2004, 18:317-324.. 
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Data reported by the participating firms included the following: 
 Number of employees at the beginning and end of each year, and the number of new 
employees hired 
 Number of workers dying in service or taking medical retirement as a result of chronic 
disease in each year.  The intent was to exclude workers dying of accidents or violence.  
Because we cannot identify the specific cause of death or retirement, there is an 
underlying level of chronic disease morbidity/mortality, exclusive of AIDS, included in 
these figures. 
 Number of days of leave (sick, compassionate, regular annual leave) taken by employees 
who died or took medical retirement due to chronic disease in the subject year. 
 Number of months on the payroll in the subject year for the employees who died or took 
medical retirement due to chronic illness.  Some employees may retire early in a year, 
and data on the full twelve months ending on the date of death/retirement was not readily 
available.  This data item was used to develop an “annualized” level of absenteeism for 
the workers lost. 
 Number of days of sick and compassionate leave taken by all other employees in the 
subject year 
 Total compensation for all workers, including salary, overtime, payroll taxes and 
benefits.  This was divided by the average number of workers in the year to obtain the 
average annual compensation per worker, and then divided by 220 to determine the 
compensation cost per working day 
 Amounts spent by the employer for health insurance coverage (by policy), including the 
amounts spent on Vitality or Vitality Day Care coverage. 
 (If applicable)  Productivity related payments made to workers who died/retired, and 
those who did not. No company paid an individual productivity bonus or piece rate. 
 
Firms were asked to estimate the costs associated with replacing a workerincluding advertising, 
selection and training.  Firms were also asked to indicate the amount of any death benefits paid 
out of current year budgets.  Amounds payable from insurance policies, payouts from pension 
plans derived from previous employer, and employee contributions and investment earnings 
were excluded. 
 
A number of employer costs which may be driven by employee illness and death were NOT 
obtained because of the difficulty in collecting or estimating such amounts.  Thus, we have no 
estimates for reductions in worker productivity when present but sick.  We have no estimates for 
the loss of supervisor time “managing around” the illness and death of a worker.  Nor do we 
estimate any reduction in the productivity of co-workers (such as funeral attendance) or the 
lower productivity of replacement workers while they being trained.  Data on workers receiving 
antiretroviral treatment with higher rates of absenteeism were not examined because standard 
human resources data do not indicate which workers are receiving ART. 
 
The data was processed and analyzed to provide the following key outcome measures for each 
year for each firm: 
 Percentage of work force dying or taking medical retirement due to chronic illness: The 
number of employees lost was divided by the average annual work force (the midpoint 
between the total number of employees at the beginning and end of the year). 
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 Number of days of sick and compassionate leave taken by workers who died or took 
medical retirement, and for the remainder of the work force: The average number of days 
of sick/compassionate leave was calculated for lost and continuing workers.  
 Costs of actual absenteeism during the year by workers who died or took medical 
retirement: The total number of days of sick and compassionate leave taken by these 
employees was multiplied by the average daily worker compensation for the firm.   
 Annualized costs of absenteeism: The actual costs were increased by assuming that the 
average number of days lost per month for the months on the payroll would have 
occurred in each month for a full twelve month period. 
 
Values were plotted for each year for each firm.  In addition, where the data was available, we 
calculated  a cost of attrition that includes the estimated costs of replacement and funeral 
benefits.  The cost of purchasing the Vitality or Vitality Day Care product for uninsured workers 
is compared to the reduction in attrition-related costs in the last intervention year.   
 
Because some of the participating firms are relatively small, available data on attrition for each 
firm was also pooled to obtain the average rate of disease-related attrition from the work force 
across all firms. 
. 
 
Results 
Participating Firms 
Five firms participated and provided work force data as requested.  Firms were promised 
confidentiality although each is receiving a report of its own results.  Firms were told that only 
the general size and industry segment would be indicated in this report.  Firm characteristics in 
2008 were as follows: 
 Firm A    >1,000 employees, manufacturing 
 Firm B     100-499 employees, retail/wholesale trade 
 Firm C      500-999 employees, retail/wholesale trade 
 Firm D      100-499 employees, tourism 
 Firm E    <100 employees, manufacturing. 
 
Firm D underwent a major corporate restructuring during this period, with the work force much 
smaller by 2008.  The results for this firm are difficult to interpret for a number of reasons.  
Work force composition and human resource reporting policies clearly change, and some 
employees who would otherwise have died in service may have been laid off or taken severance 
packages. 
 
Three firms purchased the Vitality product and one the Vitality Day Care product at the end of 
2006.  Thus we have two post-intervention years (2007, 2008) for each of these firms.  The fifth 
company made a decision to purchase Vitality coverage at the same time, but the paperwork was 
not completed and employees were not informed of the new benefit until the end of 2007.  Thus, 
we have only one intervention year (2008) for this firm.  
 
Disease-Related Attrition 
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Figure 1 shows the trend in attrition related to chronic disease at each firm studied. Firm E is the 
smallest, with fewer than 100 employees.  As a result, the percentage attrition resulting from a 
single death is large and there is much greater variability in the percentage from year to year..  
For this reason, we repeat the same data in Figure 2 without Firm E.   
 
Figure 1
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At Firms A-D, disease-related attrition in 2008 was below the peak levels reached in 2005 or 
2006, before purchasing the low cost health insurance.  Attrition was between 0.7 and 1.1% of 
the labor force in 2008, compared to highs of 1.5% to 2.0% in the pre-intervention years.  
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Figure 2
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Of course, there is a great difference in the size of the firms, and in the HIV infection rate in 
different industries.  By pooling the attrition data for all firms, we see the decline in attrition 
more clearly, as shown in Figure 3.  Attrition in the pooled work force peaked at 1.7% in 2005, 
declining each year thereafter to a low of 0.9% in 2008.  (Companies A and C did not report data 
for 2004.) 
 
Figure 3 
Medically Related Attrition
All  Companies Combined
Work Force Loss in Year Due to 
Illness
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
%
 o
f W
or
k 
Fo
rc
e
Total Work Force: 909 (2004), 2,285 (2005);  2,323 (2008)
 
 
 11 
 
Absenteeism 
The following graphs show the costs of absenteeism for the workers lost to chronic disease each 
year at each of the subject companies.  The number of actual days of paid leave taken by the 
workers lost is shown by the line.  The left hand bar in each pair shows the costs of these days, 
determined by multiplying the average daily wage for the firm times the reported number of days 
of sick/compassionate leave.  The second (generally larger) bar for each year shows the 
“annualized” cost of the days absent. This was projected assuming that the average number of 
days of sick/compassionate leave taken each month (during the period of the study year before 
the workers died/retired) would have continued for a full twelve months.   
 
 
Figure 4 
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At Company A (Figure 4), the cost of absenteeism for workers lost was highest in 2005 and 
2006, approximately N$106,000 to N$108,000(or N$185,000 to N$165,000 if annualized)   The 
cost fell thereafter to N$74,000 in 2008 (N$101,000 annualized).  This, despite an increase in 
average daily compensation of 12% over this period, from N$231 per day to $N258 per day.  
Workers who died or retired due to illness generally took five times as many compassionate/sick 
leave days as the other workers, and about 1.25 to two times the total leave (before 
annualization).  The average recorded days of leave for a lost worker varied from 22 to 43 in 
each year, up to 67 days on an annualized basis.  In contrast, the rest of the work force took 18.3 
days in 2004, rising to 22.1 days in 2007 (when lost workers took 45 days) and falling to 16.2 in 
2008.  The data do not permit us to make a judgment, but some increase in absenteeism would be 
expected if workers were receiving ART at Government clinics and taking sick leave so they 
could be seen and receive medications during regular clinic hours.  
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Figure 5 
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In 2005, Company B showed a substantial drop in days of leave and associated costs. The 
directly reported levels were only slightly higher in 2006 and 2007 (the first full year of low cost 
insurance coverage for previously uninsured workers). However, the annualized levels were 
similar to the 2004 level. The costs of attrition in 2008 were extremely low.  
  
Figure 6 
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At Company C, absenteeism and related costs rose from 2005 to 2006 and dropped back to 2005 
levels in 2008. This Company grew substantially over this period, so on a per employee basis, 
the attrition costs are lower in 2008 than in both baseline years (2005, 2006).    
 
The corresponding results for Companies D and E are not shown. At Company D, the corporate 
restructuring may have influenced the use of sick and compassionate leave. Results for Company 
E are not shown because of the larger annual fluctuations due to the company’s small size.  
 
 At Companies A, B and C, the amount of leave taken by workers who died or took medical 
retirement is lower in 2008 than it was in earlier years. So are the absenteeism-related labor 
costs. At Company C, absenteeism and related costs were similar in the last pre-intervention year 
(2006) and the first post intervention year (2007).  By 2008, however, absenteeism is down.  
There is likely a lag between the time when a new benefit is in place, when workers begin using 
it, and when the newly covered benefit actually reduces attrition.  So perhaps the encouraging 
2008 result reflects this delayed response. 
 
Cost of Purchasing Low Cost Insurance 
Companies reported the cost incurred for purchasing the low cost insurance product in 2008 as 
shown below. The cost for Company A is estimated based on the company’s statement that 
approximately 2/3 of its workers were uninsured prior to the purchase of the low-cost product.  
Company B purchased the Vitality Day Care product and paid 80% of the premium, enrolled 
workers paid the other 20%. The other companies purchased the Vitality product and paid the 
entire premium: 
 Company A   N$ 252,000 (estimate) 
Company B   N$ 293,000  
Company C   N$ 259,000    
Company D   N$  28,000  (Company D downsized in 2007-2008) 
 
Other Costs 
In the companies studied, death benefits were generally payable from insurance policies or 
contributory pension plans. Although premiums and contribution rates may be increased in the 
long run by higher disease-related attrition, we are not in a position to measure this. In the study 
companies, benefit payments made at the time of death or retirement are generally not a charge 
to the company’s operating expenses in the year the worker is lost.  However, Company C paid 
funeral benefits averaging $N23,000 per death. Since there were three times as many deaths as 
medical retirements, the cost for each worker lost was about N$17,250. 
 
We asked companies to estimate the costs associated with replacing a lost worker. This would 
include the cost of advertising, selection and formal training for the new worker, but not on-the-
job training.  These estimates were as follows 
  Company A  NA 
  Company B  N$ 3,000 per worker 
Company C N$7,500 for senior workers, N$1,800 for junior workers; 
estimated average for all positions $N2,750 
Company D  N$ 6,000-$8,000 per worker 
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Company A could not isolate the costs of hiring a replacement worker. 
 
Net Cost 
Although the comparison is imprecise, we have attempted to estimate the net benefit realized by 
the Companies that might be associated with the new insurance coverage.  This is shown in 
Table 1. Only Companies A, B and C are shown. The downsizing of Company D would skew the 
results, with fewer workers at risk in 2008. As noted earlier, Company E has been excluded from 
the analysis because of the small number of employees and large variability in attrition rates.  
 
In Columns Two (actual) and Three (annualized), we show the decline in attrition-related 
absenteeism costs from the peak year to 2008.  To cancel inflation effects, the number of days of 
attrition-associated absenteeism is multiplied by the 2008 average daily wage at the firm. In 
Column 4, we multiply the estimated replacement and funeral benefit costs per worker times the 
decline in the number of workers lost to disease from the peak year to 2008. Company C was the 
only one of the three to experience substantial growth in the study period. For this company, the 
estimates have been increased to adjust for the larger size of the work force in 2008. 
 
Column 5 shows the premium paid by the Company for low cost insurance in 2008.  The final 
column shows the net cost to the company, deducting from the new insurance premiums the 
“costs avoided” in Columns 2 or 3 and Column 4.  A range is shown depending on whether the 
costs of actual recorded or annualized absenteeism are used.  All values are in Namibian dollars.  
 
Table 1    Annual Costs and Benefits to Participating Firms 
         (all values in 2008 Namibian dollars) 
 
Company Reduction in 
Absenteeism 
Costs --Actual 
Reduction in 
Absenteeism  
Costs—Annualized  
Other  
Costs 
New 
Insurance 
Premium 
Net 
Cost 
Reduction 
(Increase) 
A 49,000 86,000 NA 252,000 (203,000)- 
(166,000) 
B 148,000 517,000 15,000 293,000 (130,000)- 
239,000 
C 28,000 72,000 60,000 259,000 (171,000)- 
(127,000) 
 
At two of these three firms (A and C), the benefits which we were able to quantify, reduced 
absenteeism and employee replacement costs, were less than the company’s new outlays to 
purchase insurance for previously uninsured workers. Company B, with a relatively high average 
wage in 2008, also showed that the new insurance expenditures did not exceed the recorded 
savings.  However, if we annualize the absenteeism benefits in this company, where losses 
dropped rapidly in the second year of insurance coverage, the firm would see a net benefit from 
the insurance purchase.   
 
 
 
 15 
Limitations 
The biggest limitation of this study is the relatively small size of the study population (less than 
2,500 workers in the five companies combined in any year) and the short intervention period.  
Four companies had the low-cost (Vitality or Vitality Day Care) benefit in place for 2007 and 
2008. The fifth company agreed to provide Vitality coverage but did not complete the 
administrative arrangements until the beginning of 2008. Even then, the promotion of the benefit 
to the company’s work force was limited. While the data from this company (A) suggest a 
decline in employee deaths related to chronic illness and attrition-related costs, this decline 
began in 2006 and is likely attributable to the relatively wide availability of ART in the public 
sector during this period. At the end of 2008, no employees of Company A were yet enrolled in 
the HIV disease management program run for Vitality policy holders. 
 
Differences in human resources record keeping in the participating companies also make it 
difficult to compare the actual costs of disease-related attrition.  Policies on sick leave and 
absenteeism vary across the firms, as do the rules regarding medical retirements. Some of the 
companies appear to have changed policies (such as the manner of recording routine leave) 
during the study period. Because we do not have full absenteeism data for the twelve months 
prior to death, we have used the “annualization” method described to estimate annual costs of 
leave taken by lost workers. This annualized “cost of attrition” calculations must be considered 
with caution. 
 
We also recognize that there are attrition-related costs which we did not capture: reduced 
productivity during the time that the sick workers were present, the costs of “managing around” 
the illness and vacancy, and any reductions in productivity as a replacement worker is trained.  
Thus, the comparison of savings and insurance costs in Table 1 understates the net benefit to the 
Company.  
 
Obviously, it would be desirable to study more firms and increase the total employee population 
analyzed.  It would have been nice to disentangle the effect of insurance supported ART and the 
growth of public ART, but this would require a sample of firms (participating and not 
participating in the low cost insurance plans) beyond the budget of this study, and probably 
larger than could be recruited in the small Namibian economy, even if study budgets were not a 
constraint.  
 
Discussion 
The good news from our study is a general secular decline in illness-related attrition in the study 
companies from 2005 to 2008. This contrasts with the increase in attrition that would be 
expected over this period given rising HIV prevalence in Namibia in the fifteen years prior to 
2007. The parent firm of some of the study companies reported deaths in service as 1.6% of the 
labor force in 2003, with a further 0.3 % of the work force taking medical retirement that year.  
Using the model of the Actuarial Society of South Africa, disease-related attrition in this group 
was forecast to increase to 3.6% (2.6% deaths, 1% medical retirement) by 2010.
9
  Instead, 
observed annual attrition rates at the firms reported here varied between 0.7 % and 1.1% of the 
                                                 
9
 See “Technical Sssistance in Developing Private Sector Resources for the Treatment of HIV/AIDS in Namibia.”  
Prepared by Frank Feeley, Pharmaccess and Actuarial Solutions for Commerical Markets Strategies Project/USAID.  
September 2004 
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labor force in 2008
10
. Workers who would otherwise be dead or disabled by AIDS-related illness 
are remaining at work in these Namibian companies.  
 
This favorable development did not occur because workers at these firms are not infected with 
HIV.  Seroprevalence studies have been conducted at these firms by Pharmaccess Namibia over 
the last three years.  Employee uptake rates varied between 73% and 83%.  Between 8% and 
22% of those tested at the study firms were HIV positive.  In the absence of antiretroviral 
therapy, these companies could expect to lose 1% to 2% of the work force to AIDS alone every 
year. 
 
Although disease-related attrition and costs are generally falling in the study firms, we cannot 
specifically link this decline to the implementation of low cost insurance policies. In part, this is 
a limitation of the study design. We do not have data on similar “control” companies that did not 
purchase the coverage for uninsured workers. It is possible that attrition fell less in the 
companies which did not purchase the insurance.    
 
Companies do not know which employees are being treated for AIDS, either publicly or 
privately.  However, insurers in Namibia use HIV/AIDS disease management organizations, 
which keep track of the number of insured emlpoyees in each company that register with the 
disease manager. Inquiries of the disease managers provide interesting insight. At one company 
(B), management strongly promoted the new benefit to its employees.  In addition, this company 
has a corporate policy that requires supervisors to discuss illness with employees, and the 
company requires a medical exam for chronically ill employees which is paid for by the 
company. The disease manager reports that a number of HIV+ employees insured under the new 
policy at this firm have enrolled for treatment. Active promotion of the ART benefit, plus the 
relatively high wage level at this company, probably explains why this firm had the most 
favorable ratio of costs (insurance premiums) to benefits (avoided attrition-related costs). In fact, 
if absenteeism costs are annualized, the benefits exceed the costs. 
 
One of the other companies, which did little promotion of the new benefit, had no HIV positive 
employees enrolled with the disease manager at the end of 2008. Deaths in service have declined 
in this company as well, but probably because HIV positive employees are taking advantage of 
expanded public ART programs. 
 
This experience echoes findings from other health insurance experiments. The mere availability 
of health insurance does not necessarily change care seeking behavior. For example, a USAID 
experiment with low-cost health insurance in the Philippines found that insureds used the benefit 
for serious illness at a designated private hospital as intended. But Filipinos tend to use these 
hospitals when they can find the funds to pay the bills.  However, the family planning benefit 
was not used because it was not actively promoted, and insureds did not change their 
contraceptive patterns (or source of care) just because of coverage
11
.  In Namibia, low-income 
workers have traditionally gone to the public sector for treatment of serious illness. They 
                                                 
10
 The fifth firm was so small (<100 workers) that a single death causes more than 1% annual attrition and the rates 
fluctuate widely between years.   
11
 The Healthsaver Experiment: Preliminary Evaluation Report.  F. Feeley, Memorandum Report to PROFIT 
Project.  May 1996. 
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apparently continue to do so despite being enrolled in the new low-cost plans. Some may have 
entered antiretroviral treatment at a public facility before the company purchased the low cost 
coverage.  Even after obtaining coverage, workers with AIDS may have sought or continued care 
in the public sector for one of several reasons: 
 public facilities were their traditional source of care in the event of serious illness; 
 workers were unaware of the nature and scope of the new insurance benefit; 
 workers (wrongly) feared that seeking care under the insurance plan would 
identify them to the employer as HIV positive;  
 workers feared for the continuity of ART should they lose their job and the related 
health insurance. 
 
Employers will reasonably ask if the purchase of the new low-cost insurance plans has an 
economic benefit to the firm.  As shown, attrition, absenteeism and costs related to work-force 
attrition have generally been falling in the study companies, but the decline predates the purchase 
of the new insurance cover.  Direct comparison of the premiums paid for the new insurance with 
the avoided costs we were able to measure does not show that the measured benefits exceed the 
costs.  But we were unable to measure some of the costs resulting from disease-related attrition, 
which would bring costs and benefits to the firms closer into balance. 
 
One unequivocal conclusion of this study is that Namibian employers are seeing a benefit to their 
labor costs from antiretroviral treatment.  They are losing fewer workers than they did a few 
years ago, and the benefit is even greater if compared to the likely increase in AIDS related 
attrition that would have occurred over this period. Whether the benefit is coming from low-cost 
health insurance or public treatment we cannot say. But employers are seeing a benefit which 
should motivate them to share in the costs of antiretroviral treatment through purchase of low 
cost insurance or some mechanism for sharing the public treatment costs now being incurred by 
the Government and donors. To encourage support for voluntary or mandatory health insurance 
schemes, the Government of Namibia should consider revising the tax status of employer-paid 
premiums, at least for lower cost policies or mandatory health insurance coverage.
12
 At the 
moment, all employer contributions to health insurance premiums are taxable as income to the 
employee. The care available from low cost health insurance plans could substitute for the tax-
funded public care now being used by many employees.   With this insurance coverage, tax 
funded outlays for care in the public system could be reduced.   To encourage substitution of risk 
pooled private medical care for public expenditure, the Government could consider exempting 
employer payments for basic health insurance benefits from income taxable to the worker.  
                                                 
12
 Economists have rightly noted that in the US, where employer premium payments are not taxed as income to the 
worker,  a tax “subsidy” goes to individuals with high marginal income tax rates and “high end” health insurance 
plans.  But in creating a risk pooling scheme in Namibia to cover most workers with basic benefits, such a 
contribution should not be considered as “income” any more than the value of the publicly funded health care which 
many of these workers now receive. 
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Appendix One 
Company Participation Letter       
 
 
Dear Prof. Feeley; 
 
I am pleased to inform you that XXX is prepared to participate in the proposed study of the 
employer impact of health insurance coverage for lower income formal sector workers in 
Namibia.  We understand that XXX will be one of six Namibian employers participating in this 
study.  The study will compare employer costs (for purchase of health insurance or health care) 
with the benefits received by employers (from reductions in illness related costs). 
 
We are prepared to provide data from XXX for the items listed below over the period from 2002 
through 2007, possibly extended through 2008 if your research grant is extended.  This data will 
cover employees at all operating units in Namibia. 
 
DATA ELEMENTS 
 
In general, each element will be reported for each calendar year on the schedule indicated in the 
following section. 
 
General Labor Force Data 
 
 Total number of regular employees (those eligible for benefits).  This will be reported for 
large subgroups of the work force in a manner convenient for XXX.  All other data will 
be reported for the same units.  Subject to discussion, some items may be reported for the 
company as a whole. 
 Total compensation of workers in the unit (so that average annual compensation can be 
calculated). 
 Number of employees dying in service and medically retired from the unit in the 
reporting period. 
 Total number of employees leaving the unit for other reasons during the year. 
 Number of employees with medical scheme coverage, by type of scheme. 
 
 
Illness-Related costs 
Absenteeism 
 
 Policy on the number of sick leave, compassionate leave days available to workers.  The 
intent is to identify any change in policy which would result in an increase/decrease in 
available leave. 
 Total number of days of leave taken by employees in the work unit in the year, broken by 
sick leave, annual leave, compassionate leave and other subcategories normally defined 
in XXX labor policy 
 
Death and Retirement Benefits 
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 Total amounts paid directly by the company for death or funeral benefits for workers in 
the unit.  This should exclude any payments made from Social Security or company 
pension funds based on prior payments by the employer and worker.  Also excluded are 
any amounts paid from death or disability insurance policies. 
 Total premiums paid for life insurance policies for workers in the unit 
 Total premiums paid for disability insurance policies for workers in the unit  
 
  
Training and Replacement Costs 
 Total cost (advertising, interviewing) for recruiting new/replacement workers for the unit. 
 Average cost for recruitment of one replacement worker in the unit.  Can be determined 
by dividing total recruitment costs for the unit by the number of new workers hired. 
 Average cost of training for a newly recruited worker in the unit.  This can be calculated 
by multiplying the average wage times the number of weeks of training time for each 
new worker, and adding any tuition or external training costs.  We can work with you in 
refining the methodology for these calculations 
 
 
Medical Insurance and Treatment Costs 
 Total employer outlays in the year for health insurance and/or medical reimbursement for 
workers in the unit. 
 Policy on company/employee share of premiums for workers and dependents. 
 
DATA COLLECTION 
The above data items will be collected and reported by XXX.  We expect that most such data can 
be obtained from existing computer systems or reports in Human Resources or Finance.  To the 
extent any data must be abstracted from individual files or recovered from the discontinued 
personnel information system, this work will be done by XXX employees who have routine 
access to such files, and shall be reported to you without individually identifying information.  
We understand that you will work with us in order to accommodate the study’s data 
requirements to our data systems to the maximum extent feasible.  If extraordinary costs would 
be incurred by XXX in assembling the data, we will so inform you, and you may modify the data 
requirements or compensate XXX for these additional costs.   
 
SCHEDULE  
We understand that no data collection will begin until the study has been approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (Ethical Review Board) of the Boston University Medical Center.   
Thereafter, data will be assembled by XXX for the period from 2002 through 2006 and reported 
to you some time in the first half of 2007.  By March of 2008, we will report the comparable data 
for 2007.  If the study is extended another year, we will report comparable data for 2008 near the 
end of the first quarter of 2009.  Exact reporting dates will be mutually agreeable and reflect the 
work load in our data processing and human resource departments. 
 
 
CONDITIONS 
Our participation in this study is specifically conditioned upon the following: 
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1. XXX will not report any individually identified data to you.  We will generally report 
aggregate values for various groups for each year over the period of the study.  If it is 
specifically necessary to link employee data in different files (for example, deaths and 
productivity payments in a period prior to death),  our staff will collect data from our files 
and report using a number that links to the individual employee only through a key which 
is controlled by XXX and is not released to Boston University. 
 
2. XXX will not be specifically identified in any published report arising from this research.  
Results reported from the analysis of our company will be reported only as Company Z, 
with an indication of the industry sector and size 
 
3. XXX will receive a company specific report detailing the analysis of XXX data in mid 
2007, with updates approximately three months after XXX provides subsequent annual 
reports to you.  Copies of the summary report and findings from the full study will be 
made available to XXX at no cost as soon as such report is completed. 
 
4. All efforts will be made to collect data in such a way as not to interfere with normal 
corporate activities, and on a schedule convenient to us. 
 
 
 
 
